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From Knowing to Understanding: Revisiting Consent
Kit Rempalaa, Marley Hornewerb, Joseph Vukova, Rohan Medaa, and Sarah Khana
aLoyola

University Chicago; bUniversity of Michigan

Dickert et al. (2020) effectively address how factors such as time limitations, stress, and illness
severity in acute conditions warrant a deeper evaluation of how current consent processes serve patients.
While data suggests that patients “prefer to be asked for permission upfront rather than waiving consent” (7),
consent forms themselves “are frequently long and technical, follow rigid templates, and contain language
that appears to prioritize institutional protection” (7). Such findings elucidate patients’ valuation of personal
agency over settling for the “benefit of the doubt” that physicians and the consent forms they provide are
acting in the patients’ best interests. In response, the authors recommend revisions to consent forms in terms
of content, structure, and tone to better facilitate patient understanding beyond the mere conveyance of
information. We aim to build on Dickert et al.’s discussion of how “consent processes serve functions
beyond facilitating an informed, autonomous decision” (7), but with a broader focus on an under-recognized
purpose of the consent process: namely, reaffirming a patient’s status as a capable, rational agent. Specifically,
we argue that patients can exercise this agency when they thoroughly understand the consent process, per
Grimm’s (2012) conception of understanding.
For Grimm, mere propositional knowledge, or “knowledge that something is the case” (105), does
not entail understanding. He offers the following illustration: “it seems that someone could have the
propositional knowledge that his house burned down because of faulty wiring (because, say, he learned this
from the reliable fire chief on the scene), even though he fails to understand why his house burned down
because he fails to see how the faulty wiring might give rise to the fire” (106). This distinction between
understanding and mere knowledge is mirrored in Dickert et al.’s discussion of consent forms, wherein “PAP
members felt that both long and technical forms were likely to overload time-crunched and stressed
individuals with information that is difficult to understand or unlikely to be related to participation” (9). Here,
the consent forms Dickert et al. discuss represent what Grimm describes as “information chunks” (105),
parts of a scaffolding-like complex the mind grasps when it understands, but mere knowledge of which is not
sufficient for understanding. When consent forms employ technical jargon or overload patients with
information, they make it difficult to determine the most important parts of a complex and how these parts
relate. They, therefore, fail to present information in a graspable manner. This yields patient uptake which is
either (1) incomplete or (2) an inaccurate reflection of the world. Subsequently, these factors threaten to
undermine the rational agency of patients’ decision-making process.
In addition to Dickert et al.’s suggestions for consent form revision, we posit that a patient’s rational
agency can be protected in this revision process by focusing on two facets of understanding identified by
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Grimm: (1) the superior ability of understanding to reflect/mirror the world, and (2) the superior status of
understanding as an intellectual achievement.
Whereas propositional knowledge provides abstract or isolated pieces of information, an accurately
constructed and grasped complex provides a more complete view of reality’s interdependent parts.
Understanding allows an individual to apprehend how “various elements of the representation or model are
related to one another” (Grimm 2012, 107), thereby allowing deeper engagement with their reality, compared
to propositional knowledge. Patients in Dickert et al.’s research perceived the information complex presented
by consent forms as inadequate and lacking interdependence between parts; they suggested the consent form
structure lacked “logical sequence,” was “choppy,” and was difficult to follow in real-time. This suggests the
presentation of information in traditional consent forms can result only in assenting to a proposition—a
direct contradiction to the agent-driven informed consent desired by Dickert et al. (Grimm 2012, 110).
Second, Grimm situates understanding as an intellectual achievement which is superior to mere
knowledge. Grimm states, “Unlike knowledge, which can simply be ‘given’ to you by a reliable testifier,
understanding always seems to require some sort of significant cognitive work on one’s own end [such that]
any success that results will always be primarily attributable to the abilities of the agent coming to understand,
rather than to anyone else” (111). Understanding is a cognitive achievement grounded in the unique
capabilities of the individual. The patient who understands is thus an active participant as a rational agent, not
merely a passive recipient of knowledge. Dickert et al. address the importance of this aspect of understanding
in their criticism that consent form features such as lengthiness, technicality of language, and “rigid
templates” (7) problematically convey a “one size fits all” approach to consent forms, leaving little room for
or even impeding the sort of personalized cognitive work necessary to constitute an achievement of
understanding.
As a response to these limitations of the consent process, we recommend as one possible remedy an
approach to consent which promotes patient understanding by incorporating interactive smart-technology
media. Procedures for such an approach would include the introduction of consent-relevant information via
an interactive tablet program. This would require patients to navigate using touch in response to on-screen
prompts, sounds, and video segments. Patients would then be encouraged to revisit the program throughout
the trial/treatment alongside friends, family, and their clinicians.
While this approach remains novel, recent work has supported similar approaches in children’s
research. For example, Mayne et al. (2016) advocate a movement away from adolescent consent as a
formality, toward an interactive smart-technology model which establishes adolescents as rational agents “by
enabling young children to understand what their participation means” (14). This recommendation grows out
concerns shared with Dickert et al: for example, concerns about how consent form lengthiness and overly
clinical language hampers patient understanding, as in the PAP members’ assessment that many patients are
lay-persons who “lack the requisite ‘medical knowledge to sort through the mud’” (9).
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In Mayne et al.’s approach, information is presented to adolescent patients through a storybook read
via a computerized touch-screen. The authors state, “interactive technologies such as a ‘touch-screen’ and
sound effects can be utilized to enhance the child’s engagement with the story” (11). This engagement
encourages what the authors refer to as “playfulness” (13), a form of receiving consent-relevant material
which is both positive and participatory. In requiring that participants grapple with a “sense of overcoming
obstacles” (Grimm 2012, 111), we believe this process exemplifies the kind of task completion that counts as
a cognitive achievement facilitating understanding and also provides a guide to what a smart-technology
consent program for adults might look like.
The smart-technology approach to consent can also allow for mutual engagement on behalf of the
patient and clinician, which can bolster the rational agency of the patient. As Mayne et al. write, “visual
representations combining images and texts can promote understanding, encourage researcher/child
discussions, [and] provide opportunities for children to practice decision-making” (9). We likewise believe
that in adult patients, interaction with a smart-technology consent program could satisfy what Dickert et al.
highlighted as patients’ desire for consent forms that “mimic an effective conversation” (15), and that could,
in turn, stimulate further conversation between patients and clinicians. Furthermore, allowing patients to keep
the tablets for the duration of the trial/procedure could aid patients in solidifying understanding by reviewing
consent information, recounting information to friends/family through what Mayne et al. call “cycle telling”
(14), and offering patients the opportunity to revisit terms of consent with their clinicians. This open-ended
relationship presented by the smart-technology format reimagines consent as a renegotiable, ongoing process,
which not only ameliorates the stress of time-restrictive decision-making, but also reaffirms patients’ statuses
as rational agents.
Finally, Mayne et al. point out that such technologies are conveniently programmable to support
diversity, and “can be adapted to meet the varying needs of children […], and is particularly suitable for preliterate or indigenous groups whose culture is strongly story- or image-based” (12). When applied to an adult
population, this feature of interactive smart-technology may, therefore, help address the “one size fits all”
issue which Dickert et al. address.
Of course, certain limitations will need to be addressed to implement the kind of smart-technology
consent process we’ve outlined: a lack of comfort or familiarity with smart-technology in some populations;
the technical issues that accompany the adoption of any new technology; novel privacy and confidentiality
concerns that are raised by the process; the additional time burden on patients; and so on. We believe,
however, that despite these limitations, the smart-technology approach offers promising possibilities for
bolstering understanding among patients and thereby addressing the issues raised by Dickert et al.
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